When Does the Personal Vote Matter for Party Loyalty? The Conditional Effects of Candidate-Centred Electoral Systems
When Does the Personal Vote Matter for Party Loyalty? The Conditional Effects of Candidate-Centred Electoral Systems
复制标题
个人投票何时对政党忠诚度很重要？
作者：
Royce Carroll;M. Nalepa
什么时候以候选人为中心的选举制度产生了无纪律的政党？在这篇文章中，我们研究了开放名单比例代表制下的党纪，这是一种与议员培养个人选区相关的制度。我们提出了一个模型，解释立法者的偏好和选民之间的支持调解政治领导人的能力，以执行纪律。我们发现，在以候选人为中心的系统中，不忠诚取决于政党执行纪律的成本，但仅以议员偏好为条件。与领导人有共同政策偏好的议员即使在领导人无法约束他们的情况下也会忠诚。为了检验模型的含义，我们使用了波兰议会立法投票的数据。我们的实证研究结果证实，不忠诚的条件是党的领导人的执行能力和议员的喜好。我们发现，立法者谁贡献更多的党在选举中的选票更不忠诚，但只有当他们的喜好偏离领导。我们的研究结果表明，开放名单和政党不忠诚之间的关系是有条件的政党制度的背景。
When do candidate-centred electoral systems produce undisciplined parties? In this article, we examine party discipline under open-list proportional representation, a system associated with MPs cultivating personal constituencies. We present a model explaining how legislators’ preferences and support among voters mediate political leaders’ ability to enforce discipline. We show that disloyalty in candidate-centred systems depends on parties’ costs for enforcing discipline, but only conditional on MP preferences. MPs who share the policy preferences of their leaders will be loyal even when the leaders cannot discipline them. To test the model’s implications, we use data on legislative voting in Poland’s parliament. Our empirical findings confirm that disloyalty is conditioned on party leaders’ enforcement capacity and MP preferences. We find that legislators who contribute more to the party electorally in terms of votes are more disloyal, but only if their preferences diverge from the leadership. Our results suggest that the relationship between open lists and party disloyalty is conditional on the context of the party system.