Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in finite symmetric games where payoff functions are integrally concave
Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in finite symmetric games where payoff functions are integrally concave
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DOI：
10.1016/j.dam.2013.12.005
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发表时间：
2014-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Takuya Iimura;Takahiro Watanabe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Takuya Iimura;Takahiro Watanabe
在本文中，我们证明了一个有限的对称对策有一个纯策略均衡，如果局中人的支付函数是整体凹的，由于Favati和Tardella（1990）。由于任何两策略博弈的支付函数都是整体凹的，这推广了Cheng等人（2004）的结果。给出了一个求纯策略均衡的简单算法。
In this paper we show that a finite symmetric game has a pure strategy equilibrium if the payoff functions of players are integrally concave due to Favati and Tardella (1990). Since the payoff functions of any two-strategy game are integrally concave, this generalizes the result of Cheng et al. (2004). A simple algorithm to find a pure strategy equilibrium is also provided.