Quality and Pricing Decisions in a Market with Consumer Information Sharing
Quality and Pricing Decisions in a Market with Consumer Information Sharing
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2675336
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发表时间：
2017-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Baojun Jiang;Bicheng Yang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Baojun Jiang;Bicheng Yang
我们提供了一个动态的，博弈论模型来研究一个公司的质量和定价决策，其新的体验产品。早期的消费者在购买之前不会观察产品质量，但可以在购买之后了解产品质量，并与后来的消费者分享产品质量信息，例如通过在线评论。企业的质量决策和成本效率都是企业的私人信息，消费者无法直接观察到。早期消费者可以从厂商的价格中理性地推断出其成本和质量，同时考虑到后来知情的消费者对厂商的利润激励。我们发现，在均衡中，一个更具成本效益的公司选择更高的质量比一个低效率的公司。人们可能会凭直觉认为，如果消费者知道一家公司的高效率，它将提供比不知道它的效率更高的质量，因为它不再需要说服消费者它不是效率低下的公司。我们的分析显示，令人惊讶的是，相反的...
We provide a dynamic, game-theoretic model to examine a firm’s quality and pricing decisions for its new experience goods. Early consumers do not observe product quality prior to purchase but can learn it after purchase and share that product-quality information with later consumers—for example, through online reviews. Both the firm’s quality decision and its cost efficiency are the firm’s private information and not directly observed by the consumer. The early consumers can make a rational inference from the firm’s price about its cost and quality taking into account the firm’s profit incentive from the later informed consumers. We find that in equilibrium a more cost-efficient firm chooses higher quality than does an inefficient firm. One might intuit that a firm will offer higher quality if its high efficiency is known to consumers than if its efficiency is not known, because it will no longer need to convince consumers that it is not the inefficient firm. Our analysis shows that, surprisingly, the opp...