Corporate philanthropic practices
Corporate philanthropic practices
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2006.02.001
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发表时间：
2006-12-01
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Smith, Janet Kiholm
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Brown, William O.;Helland, Eric;Smith, Janet Kiholm
我们使用原始数据库研究企业慈善事业，该数据库包括公司层面的美元捐赠数据，捐赠优先级，治理和管理参与捐赠计划。结果提供了一些支持的理论，给予提高股东价值，在同一行业的公司往往采取类似的给予的做法和公司，广告更密集也给更多的慈善机构。但我们的许多证据表明，代理成本在解释公司捐赠方面发挥着重要作用。董事会规模较大的公司与更多的现金捐赠和公司基金会的建立有关。与债权人的有效监督相一致，债务与价值比率较高的公司向慈善机构提供的现金较少，建立基金会的可能性也较小。实证研究考虑了行业监管对国家慈善法和信托责任法的捐赠和控制的影响。(c)2006 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。
We study corporate philanthropy using an original database that includes firm-level data on dollar giving, giving priorities, governance, and managerial involvement in giving programs. Results provide some support for the theory that giving enhances shareholder value, as firms in the same industry tend to adopt similar giving practices and firms that advertise more intensively also give more to charity. But much of our evidence indicates that agency costs play a prominent role in explaining corporate giving. Firms with larger boards of directors are associated with significantly more cash giving and with the establishment of corporate foundations. Consistent with effective monitoring by creditors, firms with higher debt-to-value ratios give less cash to charities and are less likely to establish foundations. The empirical work considers the impact of industry regulation on giving and controls for state philanthropy laws and fiduciary responsibility laws. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.