Why Brains Are Not Computers, Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism, and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes
Why Brains Are Not Computers, Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism, and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes
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DOI：
10.1007/s40614-015-0047-0
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发表时间：
2016-05-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Barrett, Louise
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Barrett, Louise
现代心理学实际上已经成为认知心理学的同义词，强调大脑是一种计算机形式，其工作是接受感官输入，处理信息并产生运动输出。这将大脑置于远离身体和环境的位置，并否认它们之间存在的亲密联系。结果，对人类和非人类动物都造成了极大的不公正：一方面，我们没有认识到非人类认知的独特性质，另一方面，我们继续宣传对人类心理能力的某种误导性观点。在这里，我建议一个更互利的，具身的，互动的观点可能会让我们提出更有趣的问题，关于各种动物如何认识它们的世界，以避免（不可避免的）认知主义观点的以自我为中心的包袱。
Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.