Positive incentives for managing groundwater in the presence of informal water markets: perspectives from India

Positive incentives for managing groundwater in the presence of informal water markets: perspectives from India
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在存在非正规水市场的情况下管理地下水的积极激励措施:印度的观点

DOI:
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发表时间:
2022
影响因子:
6.7
通讯作者:
Marie
Marie
中科院分区:
环境科学与生态学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
S. Balasubramanya;Marie

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印度的地下水正在迅速减少。在以数百万小农为特征的景观中,补贴钻井,水泵和能源的历史对水井安装的限制最小,使得标准的“基于市场的”方法,如水定价和取水配额,从成本,政治和制度的角度来看,很难引入。相反,联邦和州政府正在试验积极的激励计划,这是从生态系统服务型市场方法的报酬中吸取的,通过奖励减少地下水抽取而不是惩罚抽取。这些项目能否成功,除其他因素外,还取决于非正式地下水市场(IGM)的状况。在IGM中,威尔斯所有者除了灌溉自己的田地外,还向其他农民(通常是规模较小的农民)提供收费的灌溉服务。虽然IGM相当广泛,但关于它们的数据很差而且过时,在设计积极的激励计划时往往被忽视。这种疏忽也可能在心理上影响购买这些服务的小农获得灌溉服务的机会。IGMS的代表性和系统性的数据将有助于政策制定者设计积极的激励计划,减少地下水的抽取及其对灌溉服务的卖方和买方的福利影响之间的权衡。
Groundwater is rapidly declining in India. A history of subsidized well-drilling, pumps, and energy with minimal restrictions on well installation, in a landscape characterized by millions of smallholder farmers renders standard ‘market-based’ approaches such as water pricing and quotas on abstraction challenging to introduce from a cost, political and institutional perspective. Instead, federal and state governments are experimenting with positive incentive programs, which draw from payments-for-ecosystem-service-type market approaches, by rewarding reductions in groundwater abstraction rather than penalizing abstraction. Whether such programs succeed will depend, among other things, on the state of informal groundwater markets (IGMs) where wells owners supply irrigation services to other farmers, often smaller ones, for a charge; in addition to irrigating their own fields. While IGMs are quite extensive, data on them is poor and outdated, and are often overlooked in the design of positive incentive programs. This oversight can also detrimentally affect the access to irrigation of smaller farmers who purchase these services. Representative and systematic data on IGMS would help policy markers design positive incentive programs that are informed by the tradeoffs between reducing abstraction of groundwater and its welfare implications for sellers and buyers of irrigation services.