Can Taxes Improve Congestion on All Networks?
Can Taxes Improve Congestion on All Networks?
复制标题
税收可以改善所有网络的拥塞情况吗？
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Jason R. Marden
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Philip N. Brown;Jason R. Marden
我们问是否有可能积极影响社会行为，而不会无意中刺激病态行为。在网络路由问题中，如果网络流量是由许多独立的代理，它是已知的，自私的行为之间的代理可以导致次优的网络拥塞。我们研究的情况下，一个系统规划者收取货币通行费的网络链路的使用，努力激励有效的路由选择的用户，但在用户的敏感性收费是异构和未知的。我们寻求本地计算的通行费，保证不激励更糟糕的网络路由比在不受影响的情况下。我们的主要结果是表明，如果网络足够复杂，人口足够多样化，不正当的激励就无法系统地避免：任何改善一个网络结果的税收机制必然会降低另一个网络的结果。尽管如此，对于简单的平行网络类，非反常税确实存在，我们充分描述了所有这样的税收机制，表明它们是传统的边际成本通行费的广义版本。
We ask if it is possible to positively influence social behavior with no risk of unintentionally incentivizing pathological behavior. In network routing problems, if network traffic is composed of many individual agents, it is known that self-interested behavior among the agents can lead to suboptimal network congestion. We study situations in which a system planner charges monetary tolls for the use of network links in an effort to incentivize efficient routing choices by the users, but in which the users’ sensitivity to tolls is heterogeneous and unknown. We seek locally computed tolls that are guaranteed not to incentivize worse network routing than in the uninfluenced case. Our main result is to show that if networks are sufficiently complex and populations sufficiently diverse, perverse incentives cannot be systematically avoided: Any taxation mechanism that improves outcomes on one network must necessarily degrade them on another. Nonetheless, for the simple class of parallel networks, nonperverse taxes do exist; we fully characterize all such taxation mechanisms, showing that they are a generalized version of traditional marginal-cost tolls.