Bombing to Bargain? The Air War for Kosovo
Bombing to Bargain? The Air War for Kosovo
复制标题
轰炸讨价还价？
DOI：
10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00120.x
复制
发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
T. Vincent
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Allen;T. Vincent
鉴于空中力量作为外交政策工具的重要性，我们试图将向目标国投掷弹药的军事过程与攻击者和对手之间的外交过程明确联系起来。为了探索这两个过程之间的联系，我们看看1999年北约对科索沃的轰炸行动，这使我们能够隔离空中力量的影响。为什么北约需要78天的轰炸才能说服米洛舍维奇做出让步？比较讨价还价模型和传统的强制模型的期望，我们发现，轰炸的强度，轰炸的持续时间和调解是重要的预测塞尔维亚政府的行为在科索沃危机。
Given the prominence of air power as a foreign policy tool, we attempt to clearly link the military process of dropping munitions on the target state to the accompanying diplomatic process between the attacker and the adversary. To explore the connection between the two processes, we look at the 1999 NATO bombing campaign over Kosovo, which allows us to isolate the influence of air power. Why were 78 days of NATO bombing needed to convince Milosevic to make concessions? Comparing expectations from both bargaining models and traditional coercive models, we find that the intensity of bombing, the duration of bombing, and mediation were important predictors of the Serbian government's behavior during the Kosovo crisis.