Promises and Partnership
Promises and Partnership
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.380083
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发表时间：
2006-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Charness;M. Dufwenberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Charness;M. Dufwenberg
我们通过实验研究沟通对信任与合作的影响。我们的设计允许遵守承诺、谎言和信念。这些证据与人们努力满足他人的期望以避免内疚的情况是一致的，这可以使用心理博弈论进行建模。当玩家表现出这种内疚厌恶时，沟通可能会通过影响关于信念的信念来影响动机和行为。我们观察到，承诺可以增强值得信赖的行为。我们认为，内疚厌恶可能与理解各种环境中的战略互动相关，并且它可能揭示语言、讨论、协议和社会规范在这些环境中的作用。版权所有计量经济学会 2006。（此摘要借自本项目的另一个版本。）
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game theory. When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs. Promises may enhance trustworthy behavior, which is what we observe. We argue that guilt aversion may be relevant for understanding strategic interaction in a variety of settings, and that it may shed light on the role of language, discussions, agreements, and social norms in these contexts. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)