The Right to Quantitative Privacy
The Right to Quantitative Privacy
复制标题
量化隐私权
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Citron
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
David C. Gray;D. Citron
在监控技术的巨大进步的推动下，我们对第四修正案的概念正在发生历史性转变。政府及其私营部门代理继续在大规模数据挖掘项目、先进分析、融合中心和无人机上投资数十亿美元，所有这些都没有认真考虑这些技术带来的宪法问题。在美国诉琼斯案中，最高法院发出信号，表明它将结束对这个不断扩大的监控状态的默许。在该案中，五名大法官签署了一致意见，为一个革命性的命题辩护：公民在有关其公共或共享活动的大量信息中拥有第四修正案的利益，即使他们在宪法细节中缺乏对隐私的合理期望。自那以后，对第四修正案的这种量化方法一直是法庭内外激烈辩论的主题。其中最引人注目的挑战是关于量化隐私的宪法谱系、它如何在实践中实施以及它的理论后果的问题。这篇文章讨论了这些挑战。琼斯之后的讨论一直被一些提案所主导，这些提案寻求通过关注执法人员在调查过程中收集的信息“马赛克”来评估和保护量化隐私。我们认为，这种逐案处理的方法既误解了事关重大的第四修正案问题，又带来了严重的实际挑战。借鉴信息隐私法的经验教训，我们建议立法机构和法院在琼斯的阴影下采取行动，将重点放在技术上。在这种以技术为中心的方法下，任何能够促进持续和不分青红皂白的监控的广泛项目的技术都将受到第四修正案的监管。这并不意味着政府将被禁止使用这些技术。相反，它将要求它们的部署和使用条款反映出隐私问题与执法部门在预防、侦查和起诉犯罪方面的利益之间的合理平衡。这一条就立法机关和法院如何在提供马赛克理论批评者正确要求的明确指导和可预测性的同时如何取得这种平衡提出了具体建议。
We are at the cusp of a historic shift in our conceptions of the Fourth Amendment driven by dramatic advances in surveillance technology. Governments and their private sector agents continue to invest billions of dollars in massive data-mining projects, advanced analytics, fusion centers, and aerial drones, all without serious consideration of the constitutional issues that these technologies raise. In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court signaled an end to its silent acquiescence in this expanding surveillance state. In that case, five justices signed concurring opinions defending a revolutionary proposition: that citizens have Fourth Amendment interests in substantial quantities of information about their public or shared activities, even if they lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the constitutive particulars. This quantitative approach to the Fourth Amendment has since been the subject of hot debate on and off the courts. Among the most compelling challenges are questions about quantitative privacy’s constitutional pedigree, how it can be implemented in practice, and its doctrinal consequences. This Article takes up these challenges. The conversation after Jones has been dominated by proposals that seek to assess and protect quantitative privacy by focusing on the informational “mosaics” assembled by law enforcement officers in the course of their investigations. We think that this case-by-case approach both misunderstands the Fourth Amendment issues at stake and begets serious practical challenges. Drawing on lessons from information privacy law, we propose as an alternative that legislatures and courts acting in the shadow of Jones focus on the technologies. Under this technology-centered approach, any technology that is capable of facilitating broad programs of continuous and indiscriminate surveillance would be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation. This does not mean that government would be barred from using these technologies. Rather, it would require that the terms of their deployment and use reflect a reasonable balance between privacy concerns and law enforcement’s interests in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting crime. This Article offers concrete proposals for how legislatures and courts might strike this balance while providing the clear guidance and predictability that critics of the mosaic theory rightly demand.