Bioethics as Politics: The Limits of Moral Expertise
Bioethics as Politics: The Limits of Moral Expertise
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作为政治的生命伦理学：道德专业知识的局限性
DOI：
10.1353/ken.2005.0023
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
M. Powers
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Powers
对生物伦理学家的特殊专长的日益依赖，以及公众和专业人士对生物伦理学家的特殊专长的日益怀疑，表明有必要考虑道德专长的局限性。对于所有关于生命伦理学方法的讨论，我们，生命伦理学家，在理解我们正在做什么方面仍然相当遥远，即使我们可能正在做我们正在做的事情。通常，最根本的利害关系，但同样经常没有得到充分承认的，是本质上政治的，基本上是对个人和社会组织最引人注目和最有吸引力的生活形式的有争议的愿景。生命伦理学的现状与18世纪法学中的类似辩论相似，特别是杰里米·边沁对司法论证的普遍形式的批判，以及他自己同样不成功的尝试，即在伦理学中发展一种在政治之上运作的决策程序。当时和现在的风险是，我们将无法认识到广泛的合理分歧，这些分歧将继续存在，超过了深入思考和讨论的时间点。
The increasing reliance upon, and perhaps the growing public and professional skepticism about, the special expertise of bioethicists suggests the need to consider the limits of moral expertise. For all the talk about method in bioethics, we, bioethicists, are still rather far off the mark in understanding what we are doing, even when we may be going about what we are doing fairly well. Quite often, what is most fundamentally at stake, but equally often insufficiently acknowledged, are inherently political, essentially contested visions of the most compelling and attractive forms of life for individuals and social organization. The current situation in bioethics parallels similar debates in eighteenth-century jurisprudence, especially Jeremy Bentham's withering critique of the prevalent forms of judicial argument and his own, equally unsuccessful, attempt to develop a decision-making procedure in ethics that would operate on a plane above politics. The risk, both then and now, is that we will fail to appreciate the wide range of reasonable disagreement that will remain past the point of extended reflection and discussion.