Voting for Victors: Why Violent Actors Win Postwar Elections
Voting for Victors: Why Violent Actors Win Postwar Elections
复制标题
投票给胜利者：为什么暴力演员赢得战后选举
作者：
S. Daly
为什么公民会选举对平民实施暴力的政治行为者？尽管他们使用暴行，但在过去的交战组织中根深蒂固的政党赢得了战后世界各国的民主选举。本文使用了1970年至2010年间全球战后选举的最新跨国数据，以及来自萨尔瓦多的投票、调查、档案和访谈数据。研究发现，交战各方在战后不同程度的选举成功不能用他们战时的暴力程度或使用选举强制来解释，而是用冲突结束时军事力量的分配来解释。它认为，军事上较强的交战国能够为和平邀功，这转化为在提供安全方面有能力的声誉。这使他们能够拥有安全价值问题，这往往是横切分裂，并吸引摇摆选民。实力较强的交战方提供的安全保障抵消了他们的暴行，并为其辩护，使他们的选举变得理性。这篇文章揭示了暴力事件发生后的政治生活。它还有助于理解安全投票，并提供了人们为什么以看似违反直觉的方式投票的见解。
abstract:Why do citizens elect political actors who have perpetrated violence against the civilian population? Despite their use of atrocities, political parties with deep roots in the belligerent organizations of the past win postwar democratic elections in countries around the world. This article uses new, cross-national data on postwar elections globally between 1970 and 2010, as well as voting, survey, archival, and interview data from El Salvador. It finds that belligerents' varied electoral success after wars can be explained not by their wartime levels of violence or use of electoral coercion, but by the distribution of military power at the end of conflict. It argues that militarily stronger belligerents are able to claim credit for peace, which translates into a reputation for competence on the provision of security. This enables them to own the security valence issue, which tends to crosscut cleavages, and to appeal to swing voters. The stronger belligerents' provision of security serves to offset and justify their use of atrocities, rendering their election rational. This article sheds light on political life after episodes of violence. It also contributes to understanding security voting and offers insights into why people vote in seemingly counterintuitive ways.