Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value
Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value
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DOI：
10.1017/s1358246109000046
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发表时间：
2009-01-01
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Pritchard, Duncan
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作者：
Pritchard, Duncan
知识具有独特的价值，这是一种普遍存在的前理论直觉。如果情况并非如此，那么为什么知识成为如此多的认识论理论的焦点，而不是像合理的真实信仰这样的其他认识论立场，那就太神秘了。然而，考虑到这一事实，对于知识理论来说，它能够很好地解释为什么我们有这种直觉，这显然很重要。事实上，乔纳森·克万维格（Jonathan Kvanvig，2003）和蒂莫西·威廉姆森（Timothy Williamson，2000）等人认为，如果知识理论不能清楚地说明为什么知识具有独特的价值，那么这就是对知识的决定性打击。然而，我们不需要走这么远。重要的是知识理论能够充分解释这种直觉。解释直觉的一种非常直接的方法是提供一种知识理论，该理论证明了为什么知识以我们直觉假设的方式具有独特的价值。我们将此类提议称为验证性提议，因为它们旨在验证我们对知识价值的前理论直觉。例如，Linda Zagzebski（1996；1999；2003）和 John Greco（2002；2007；即将发表）就提出了此类立场，我们将在下面考虑这方面的一项此类提案。但请注意，人们不需要验证直觉来解释它。相反，人们可以提出一种知识理论，根据该理论，知识并不具有独特的价值，但它可以解释为什么我们可能在理论前就认为知识具有独特的价值。我们将此类提议称为修正主义，因为它们修正了我们关于知识价值的前理论直觉。例如，马克·卡普兰（Mark Kaplan，1985）著名地指出，后盖蒂尔文学的道德观是，具有独特价值的不是知识，而是经过论证的真实信念——知识是经过论证的真实信念加上反盖梯尔的条件——但由于经过论证的真实信念通常足以构成知识，所以这个错误是完全自然的。第二个提议
It is a widespread pre-theoretical intuition that knowledge is distinctively valuable. If this were not so, then it would be simply mysterious why knowledge has been the focus of so much of epistemological theorising, rather than some other epistemic standing like justified true belief. Given this fact, however, it is obviously important to a theory of knowledge that it is able to offer a good explanation of why we have this intuition. Indeed, some, such as Jonathan Kvanvig (2003) and Timothy Williamson (2000), have argued that if a theory of knowledge does not make it transparent why knowledge is distinctively valuable then this is a decisive strike against it. We do not need to go this far, however. What is important is just that a theory of knowledge is able to adequately account for this intuition. One very direct way of accounting for the intuition would be to offer a theory of knowledge which demonstrated why knowledge is distinctively valuable in the manner that we intuitively suppose. We will call proposals of this sort validatory, since they aim to validate our pre-theoretical intuitions about the value of knowledge. Positions of this sort have been offered by, for example, Linda Zagzebski (1996; 1999; 2003) and John Greco (2002; 2007; forthcominga), and we will consider one such proposal in this respect below. Notice, however, that one does not need to validate an intuition in order to account for it. One could instead put forward a theory of knowledge on which knowledge is not distinctively valuable, but which could explain why we might pre-theoretically think that knowledge is distinctively valuable. We will call proposals of this sort revisionist, since they revise our pre-theoretical intuitions about the value of knowledge. Mark Kaplan (1985), for example, famously argued that the moral of the post-Gettier literature was that it is not knowledge which is distinctively valuable but rather justified true belief–knowledge being justified true belief plus an anti-Gettier condition–but that since justified true belief usually sufficed for knowledge, the mistake was entirely natural. A second proposal