Contract design and self-control: Theory and evidence
Contract design and self-control: Theory and evidence
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DOI：
10.1162/0033553041382111
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发表时间：
2004-05-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Malmendier, U
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
DellaVigna, S;Malmendier, U
理性企业如何应对消费者偏见？在本文中，我们分析了如果消费者具有时间不一致的偏好并且对此部分天真的情况下企业的利润最大化合同设计。我们考虑两类商品的市场：具有直接成本和延迟收益的商品（投资品），例如参加健身俱乐部；以及具有直接收益和延迟成本的商品（休闲商品），例如信用卡融资消费。我们与部分幼稚的时间不一致的消费者建立了利润最大化合同设计的三个特征。首先，企业将投资品定价低于边际成本。其次，企业将休闲商品定价高于边际成本。第三，对于各类商品企业引入转换成本并收取回扣费用，合同设计针对的是消费者对未来消费的误解和对更新概率的低估。该理论的预测与信用卡、赌博、健身俱乐部、人寿保险、邮购、移动电话和度假分时行业的实证合同设计相匹配。我们还表明，只有当消费者天真时，时间不一致才会对消费者福利产生不利影响。
How do rational firms respond to consumer biases? In this paper we analyze the profit-maximizing contract design of firms if consumers have time-inconsistent preferences and are partially naive about it. We consider markets for two types of goods: goods with immediate costs and delayed benefits (investment goods) such as health club attendance, and goods with immediate benefits and delayed costs (leisure goods) such as credit card-financed consumption. We establish three features of the profit-maximizing contract design with partially naive time-inconsistent consumers. First, firms price investment goods below marginal cost. Second, firms price leisure goods above marginal cost. Third, for all types of goods firms introduce switching costs and charge back-loaded fees, The contractual design targets consumer misperception of future consumption and underestimation of the renewal probability. The predictions of the theory match the empirical contract design in the credit card, gambling, health club, life insurance, mail order, mobile phone, and vacation time-sharing industries. We also show that time inconsistency has adverse effects on consumer welfare only if consumers are naive.