The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach
The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach
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法院令人困惑的（内部）依赖性：比较方法
DOI：
10.1086/467943
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Ramseyer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Ramseyer
作为法学教授，我们靠法庭谋生。我们研究它们。1我们用它们来证明我们的薪水是合理的。当然，我们强调其重要性。与此同时，我们还强调他们独立于选举市场。我们的美国律师协会宣称：“一个独立而可敬的司法机构对我们社会的正义是不可或缺的。”我们学者经常回答：“所有热爱自由的国家都是忠实于司法独立的原则的。”基本的比较研究表明，独立的司法机构（这里定义为不受政客操纵的法院）
As law professors, we make our living off the courts. We study them.1 We use them to justify our salaries. Naturally, we stress their importance. Concurrently, we also stress their independence from the electoral marketplace. "An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society," our American Bar Association proclaims.2 And "all freedom-loving nations are faithful, after their fashion, to the principle of judicial independence," we scholars too often reply.3 We exaggerate badly, of course, and that exaggeration is the source of the puzzle at hand. Basic comparative research shows that independent judiciaries (defined here as courts where politicians do not manipulate