Career Concerns with Exponential Learning
Career Concerns with Exponential Learning
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指数学习的职业担忧
DOI：
10.3982/te2115
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Johannes Hörner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Bonatti;Johannes Hörner
本文分析了市场结构对职业关注的影响。努力增加了一个熟练的代理人实现一次性突破的可能性。工资是根据评估的能力和预期的产出。对于任何工资，代理人工作太少，太晚。在短期合同下，由于不同时期努力水平的战略可替代性，努力和工资是与资历单峰。如果努力是可观察的，则延迟和提供不足的努力都会恶化。竞争企业对工资的承诺减轻了这些低效率。在这种情况下，最优合同的特点是分段固定工资和遣散费。
This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. For any wage, the agent works too little, too late. Under short-term contracts, effort and wages are single-peaked with seniority, due to the strategic substitutability of effort levels at different times. Both delay and underprovision of effort worsen if effort is observable. Commitment to wages by competing firms mitigates these inefficiencies. In that case, the optimal contract features piecewise constant wages and severance pay.