A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure
A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure
复制标题
银行倒闭的积极分析
DOI：
10.1006/jfin.1994.1007
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发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
5.2
通讯作者：
Loretta J. Mester
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Mailath;Loretta J. Mester
摘要本文研究了监管者关闭存款机构的动机，认识到监管者关闭银行的政策会影响机构的风险承担，并且关闭银行存在由于其中介功能而产生的机会成本。监管者关注的不是银行当前的资产组合，而是银行未来的资产组合。即使监管者寻求福利最大化，也无法获得第一个最佳福利，因为监管者无法合理地承诺某些关于关闭的政策。经济文献分类号：G2，L5，G1。
Abstract This paper investigates the incentives of a regulator to close depository institutions, recognizing that an institution′s risk taking will be influenced by the regulator′s policy regarding bank closure and that there are opportunity costs in closing banks arising from their intermediation function. The regulator focuses not on the current portfolio of the bank, but on the bank′s future portfolio. Even if the regulator seeks to maximize welfare, the first best is not obtainable because the regulator is unable to credibly commit to certain policies regarding closure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G2, L5, G1.