Passing the Buck On the acceptance of responsibility
Passing the Buck On the acceptance of responsibility
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DOI：
10.1016/j.rie.2016.07.003
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发表时间：
2017-03-01
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Bolle, Friedel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Bolle, Friedel
在传递Buck博弈中，群体中的n个成员按照给定的顺序决定是否产生成本，以便他们能够为了群体的利益而解决某个问题。推卸责任意味着一个人依赖于继任者的服务。这一决定受到社会偏好和战略考虑的影响。我们从n=3和n=4的实验中得到了三个主要结论：(I)关于其他玩家偏好的不完全信息的Buck博弈传递的唯一完美贝叶斯均衡一般符合数据，但有两个有趣的例外。(Ii)如果反向归纳法需要两个以上的步骤，即，对于n=4的博弈中的第一个玩家，则反向归纳法失效。(Iii)使组中的一名成员成为仅有能力解决问题的“专家”与社会偏好的变化有关。(C)2017年威尼斯大学。爱思唯尔有限公司出版。保留所有权利。
In the Passing the Buck game, the n members of a group decide in a given order whether or not to incur costs so that they can fix a certain problem for the benefit of the group. Passing the Buck means that one relies on the service of a successor. The decision is influenced by social preferences and by strategic considerations. We derive three main conclusions from experiments with n=3 and n=4. (i) The unique perfect Baysian equilibrium of the Passing the Buck game with incomplete information about the preferences of other players generally fits the data, however with two interesting exceptions. (ii) Backward induction breaks down if it requires more than two steps, i.e., for the first player in the game with n=4. (iii) Making one of the members of the group an "expert" who alone is competent to fix the problem is connected with a change of social preferences. (C) 2017 University of Venice. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.