Inequality and Institutional Quality in a Growth Model
Inequality and Institutional Quality in a Growth Model
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增长模型中的不平等和制度质量
DOI：
10.1007/s40844-020-00195-w
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Masashi Takahashi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takuma Kunieda;Masashi Takahashi
通过应用一个在工人和罪犯之间进行职业选择的增长模型，我们得到了一条制度库兹涅茨曲线。利用从模型中导出的基尼系数，我们研究了制度质量如何影响代理人之间的财富不平等。在资本份额相对较高的情况下，可以出现制度库兹涅茨曲线。在这种情况下，制度质量的提高降低了被盗的可能性，但增加了被盗财富的数量。在经济发展初期，由于后一种效应支配着前一种效应，不平等随着制度质量的提高而扩大。相反，由于在后期情况正好相反，一旦制度足够成熟，不平等就会缩小。在资本份额较低的情况下，不可能出现制度性库兹涅茨曲线。在这种情况下，随着制度质量的提高，不平等会单调地缩小。此外，我们提出了减少不平等和实现最佳结果的政府政策。
By applying a growth model of an occupational choice between being a worker and being a criminal, an institutional Kuznets curve is produced. Using the Gini coefficient derived from the model, we investigate how institutional quality affects wealth inequality across agents. In the case of a relatively higher capital share, an institutional Kuznets curve can emerge. In this case, an improvement in institutional quality decreases the possibility of being stolen but increases the amount of wealth stolen. In the early stage of economic development, since the latter effect dominates the former, inequality widens as institutional quality improves. In contrast, since the converse is true in the late stage, inequality shrinks once institutions have sufficiently matured. In the case of a lower capital share, an institutional Kuznets curve cannot emerge. In this case, inequality monotonically shrinks as institutional quality improves. Furthermore, we present government policies that reduce inequality and achieve the first-best outcome.