Globalizing Electoral Politics: Political Competence and Distributional Bargaining in the European Union
Globalizing Electoral Politics: Political Competence and Distributional Bargaining in the European Union
复制标题
全球化选举政治：欧盟的政治能力和分配谈判
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Schneider
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Schneider
本文分析了欧盟分配谈判中的选举周期。作者认为，政府试图在选举前将其欧盟成员国的福利提高到高于平均水平，希望在选民面前表现出政治能力。该理论讨论了欧盟成员国何时以及如何在选举前通过部长理事会的谈判来增加这些收益。对欧盟成员国1977年至2006年年度预算谈判的时间序列横截面分析支持分配谈判中存在有条件的选举周期，并普遍指出在分析国际合作模式时考虑这种周期的重要性。
This article analyzes electoral cycles in distributional bargaining in the European Union. The author argues that governments attempt to increase their EU membership benefits above average levels in the preelection period, hoping to appear politically competent to voters. The theory discusses when and how EU members can increase these gains before elections through negotiations in the Council of Ministers. A time-series cross-sectional analysis of EU member states’ annual budget negotiations from 1977 to 2006 supports the existence of conditional electoral cycles in distributional bargaining and generally points to the importance of accounting for such cycles when analyzing patterns of international cooperation.