A market mechanism for truthful bidding with energy storage
A market mechanism for truthful bidding with energy storage
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DOI：
10.1016/j.epsr.2022.108284
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发表时间：
2021-09
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
R. Bansal;Pengcheng You;D. Gayme;Enrique Mallada
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Bansal;Pengcheng You;D. Gayme;Enrique Mallada
提出了一种发电商和蓄电商参与的多时段电力市场机制。从供应功能招标的想法，我们引入了一种新的投标结构的存储参与，允许存储单元的沟通，其成本的市场使用能源循环功能，映射价格到周期深度。由此产生的市场清算过程-通过凸规划实现-根据传统的电力供应能源价格和存储利用的每个周期价格产生相应的时间表和支付。我们说明了我们的解决方案的好处，通过比较的竞争性均衡-假设价格接受者的参与者-所产生的机制的替代解决方案，使用以产消者为基础的出价。我们的解决方案显示了几个优势，比标准的prosumer为基础的方法，价格每插槽的能源。它不需要先验的价格估计。它还激励参与者披露他们的真实成本，从而导致有效的竞争均衡。使用纽约独立系统运营商（NYISO）的数据验证了我们的研究结果。
This paper proposes a market mechanism for multi-interval electricity markets with generator and storage participants. Drawing ideas from supply function bidding, we introduce a novel bid structure for storage participation that allows storage units to communicate their cost to the market using energy-cycling functions that map prices to cycle depths. The resulting market-clearing process – implemented via convex programming – yields corresponding schedules and payments based on traditional energy prices for power supply and per-cycle prices for storage utilization. We illustrate the benefits of our solution by comparing the competitive equilibrium – assuming price-taker participants – of the resulting mechanism to that of an alternative solution that uses prosumer-based bids. Our solution shows several advantages over the standard prosumer-based approach that prices energy per slot. It does not require a priori price estimation. It also incentivizes participants to reveal their truthful cost, thus leading to an efficient, competitive equilibrium. Numerical experiments using New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) data validate our findings.