Towards Replay-resilient RFID Authentication
Towards Replay-resilient RFID Authentication
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DOI：
10.1145/3241539.3241541
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发表时间：
2018-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ge Wang;Haofan Cai;Chen Qian;Jinsong Han;Xin Li;H. Ding;Jizhong Zhao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ge Wang;Haofan Cai;Chen Qian;Jinsong Han;Xin Li;H. Ding;Jizhong Zhao
我们提供了一个重要问题的第一个解决方案，“物理层身份验证方法如何抵御信号重放攻击”。人们认为，如果攻击者可以重放与合法身份验证对象（如RFID标签）完全相同的应答信号，则任何物理层身份验证方法都将失败。本文提出了Hu-Fu，第一个物理层的RFID认证协议，是弹性的主要攻击，包括标签伪造，信号重放，信号补偿，和蛮力特征回复。Hu-Fu建立在两个基本思想上，即两个标签的电感耦合和信号随机化。Hu-Fu不需要对COTS无源标签进行任何硬件或协议修改，可以使用COTS设备实现。我们实现了一个原型的Hu-Fu，并证明它是准确和强大的设备多样性和环境变化，包括位置，距离和温度。Hu-Fu提供了一个新的无电池/低功耗设备认证方向，支持众多物联网应用。
We provide the first solution to an important question, "how a physical-layer authentication method can defend against signal replay attacks''. It was believed that if an attacker can replay the exact same reply signal of a legitimate authentication object (such as an RFID tag), any physical-layer authentication method will fail. This paper presents Hu-Fu, the first physical layer RFID authentication protocol that is resilient to the major attacks including tag counterfeiting, signal replay, signal compensation, and brute-force feature reply. Hu-Fu is built on two fundamental ideas, namely inductive coupling of two tags and signal randomization. Hu-Fu does not require any hardware or protocol modification on COTS passive tags and can be implemented with COTS devices. We implement a prototype of Hu-Fu and demonstrate that it is accurate and robust to device diversity and environmental changes, including locations, distance, and temperature. Hu-Fu provides a new direction of battery-free/low-power device authentication that enables numerous IoT applications.