Competitive, cooperative and Stackelberg congestion pricing for multiple regions in transportation networks
Competitive, cooperative and Stackelberg congestion pricing for multiple regions in transportation networks
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DOI：
10.1080/18128602.2010.502547
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发表时间：
2011-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Xiaoning Zhang;H.M. Zhang;Haijun Huang;Lijun Sun;Tie-Qiao Tang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xiaoning Zhang;H.M. Zhang;Haijun Huang;Lijun Sun;Tie-Qiao Tang
在以往的拥挤收费研究中，假设网络由一个中央管理机构管理，其目标是提高整个网络的性能。然而，在实践中，交通网络通常覆盖多个行政区域，并且每个局部区域中的子网络由地方交通管理局单独管理，可能具有竞争目标。在这篇文章中，我们提出了实际的定价方案，可以考虑到网络的不同行政区域之间的竞争和/或合作。纳什和Stackelberg游戏都被用来捕捉局部区域的行为。数值算例表明，局部区域定价对整个网络有利或有害，取决于网络的结构和O-D模式。区域间的拥挤定价合作可以提高系统的整体社会福利。
In the previous studies of congestion pricing, it is assumed that the network is managed by a central authority with the objective to enhance the performance of the whole network. In practice, however, a transportation network often covers multiple administrative regions, and the subnetwork in each local region is managed separately by the local transportation authority with perhaps competing objectives. In this article, we propose practical pricing schemes that can take into account competition and/or collaboration between different administrative regions of the network. Both Nash and Stackelberg games are employed to capture the behaviour of local regions. Numerical examples show that local regional pricing may be beneficial or detrimental to the whole network, depending on the structure and O–D pattern of the network. And cooperation among regions in congestion pricing can improve overall system performance in terms of total social welfare.