A Fair Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing in Crowd Sensing
A Fair Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing in Crowd Sensing
复制标题
群体感知众包的公平激励机制
DOI：
10.1109/jiot.2016.2600634
复制
发表时间：
2016-12-01
影响因子：
10.6
通讯作者：
Gui, Xiaolin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhu, Xuan;An, Jian;Gui, Xiaolin
人群感知是一种从人群中收集大量感知信息的新模式。不幸的是，并不是每个人都愿意参与传感任务或提供高质量的信息。提供激励是提高CS成功率的常用方法。现有的基于拍卖模型的激励机制缺乏对恶意竞争行为和“搭便车”现象的深入考虑。本文提出的设计重点是基于反向拍卖的激励机制。首先，构建了众包系统激励模型。其次，提出了一种基于拍卖的激励机制，它结合了反向拍卖和维克瑞拍卖的概念。接下来，证明该机制是计算效率高，个人理性，平衡，真实和诚实的。仿真结果表明，该激励机制能有效提高投标的公平性和感知数据的质量。
Crowd sensing (CS) is a new paradigm of collecting large amounts of sensing information from a crowd. Unfortunately, not everyone is willing to participate in sensing tasks or provide high-quality information. Offering incentives is a common method of increasing the success of CS. Existing incentive mechanisms based on auction models lack deep consideration regarding the effects of malicious competition behavior and the “free-riding” phenomenon in crowdsourcing services. The design proposed in this paper focuses on an incentive mechanism based on a reverse auction. First, the crowdsourcing system incentive model is built. Second, an incentive mechanism is proposed based on an auction which combines the concepts of reverse auctions and Vickrey auctions. Next, proof that the mechanism is computationally efficient, individually rational, budget-balanced, truthful, and honest is provided. Simulation results indicate that the proposed incentive mechanism can effectively improve fairness of the bids and the quality of the sensed data.