The European Parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals
The European Parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals
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欧洲议会和环境立法：化学品案例
DOI：
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Anastassios Kalandrakis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
George Tsebelis;Anastassios Kalandrakis
本文研究了欧洲议会对在合作程序下引入的化学污染物立法的影响。一系列正式和非正式的分析预测，从重大影响的欧洲议会，有限的影响（仅在第二轮），没有影响。通过对议会辩论以及欧盟委员会和议会委员会文件的分析，我们能够评估不同修正案的重要性，以及它们在理事会最后决定中的体现程度。我们的分析表明，第一，不到30%的欧洲议会修正案是微不足道的，而15%是重要的或非常重要的;第二，无论其重要性如何，接受修正案的概率是相同的。进一步的分析表明，总体环境保护统计数据的偏差有两个来源：几项修正案是互补的（在法律的文件的不同地方处理同一问题），以及一系列因不可接受而被拒绝的修正案（因为它们违反了文件的法律的基础或原始性要求）被列入随后的立法中。我们在样本中计算了这些偏见的影响，发现官方统计数据低估了议会的影响力超过6个百分点（在我们的样本中为49%而不是56%）。最后，我们比较了一系列观察到的战略行为的不同的演员（报告员，委员会，地板，委员会）不同的期望所产生的文献。
The paper studies the impact of the EP on legislation on chemical pollutants introduced under the Cooperation procedure. A series of formal and informal analyses have predicted from significant impact of the EP, to limited impact (only in the second round) to no impact at all. Through the analysis of Parliamentary debates as well as Commission and Parliamentary committee documents, we are able to assess the significance of different amendments, as well as the degree to which they were introduced in the final decision of the Council. Our analysis indicates first that less than 30% of EP amendments are insignificant, while 15% are important or very important; second, that the probability of acceptance of an amendment is the same regardless of its significance. Further analysis indicates two sources of bias of aggregate EP statistics: several amendments are complementary (deal with the same issue in different places of the legal document), and a series of amendments that are rejected as inadmissible (because they violate the legal basis of the document or the germainess requirement) are included in subsequent pieces of legislation. We calculate the effect of these biases in our sample, and find that official statistics underestimate Parliamentary influence by more than 6 percentage points (49% instead of 56% in our sample). Finally, we compare a series of observed strategic behaviors of different actors (rapporteurs, committees, floor, Commission) to different expectations generated by the literature.