Free ticket, discount ticket or intermediate of the best of two worlds - Which subsidy policy is socially optimal to suppress the disease spreading?
Free ticket, discount ticket or intermediate of the best of two worlds - Which subsidy policy is socially optimal to suppress the disease spreading?
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110682
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发表时间：
2021-03-27
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Tanimoto, Jun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tatsukawa, Yuichi;Arefin, Md Rajib;Tanimoto, Jun
借助无标度网络上的进化疫苗接种博弈，我们设计了一种新的补贴政策，称为程度依赖补贴，合作主体根据其连通性或程度获得激励。也就是说，代理人的学历越高，获得的激励就越高，反之亦然。在这里我们假设疫苗接种者是合作代理人。新方案可以说是介于之前研究的两项政策（即免费门票和统一折扣政策）之间的中间政策。前者优先向合作枢纽代理商发放免费门票，后者则向每个合作代理商发放固定折扣。我们从传染性较低的状态和最小的社会成本方面比较每项政策的效率。在调查这三项政策的平均社会收益（考虑到疫苗接种成本和感染成本）方面的表现时，发现当补贴预算相当低时，免费门票计划是三项政策中最具吸引力的政策。程度依赖补贴政策在适度的预算规模下表现优于其他政策，而统一折扣政策则需要更高的预算才能有效抑制疾病。我们进一步估计了每项政策的补贴预算阈值水平，超过该阈值补贴将导致疫苗接种的过度使用。整体来看，从疫苗接种覆盖率和最终疫情规模来看，学位补贴方案优于统一折扣方案，但以免票政策为主。 (C) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. 保留所有权利。
With the aid of the evolutionary vaccination game on a scale-free network, we design a new subsidy policy, named degree dependent subsidy, where cooperative agents get incentives according to their connectivity or degree. That is, agents, having a greater degree, receive a higher incentive, and vice versa. Here we presume that vaccinators are cooperative agents. The new scheme can be said to an intermediate policy between two previously studies policies, namely free ticket and flat discount policies. The former policy distributes free tickets to cooperative hub agents as a priority, whereas the latter dispenses a fixed discount to every cooperator. We compare the efficiency of each policy in terms of having a less infectious state with a minimum social cost. While investigating the performance of the three policies in terms of average social payoff-which takes into account the cost of vaccination as well as infection-the free ticket scheme is found to be the most appealing policies among the three when the budget for subsidy is quite low. The degree dependent subsidy policy outperforms others for a moderate budget size, while the flat discount policy requires a higher budget to effectively suppress the disease. We further estimate threshold levels of the subsidy budget for each policy beyond which subsidizing results in excessive use of vaccination. As a whole, concerning vaccination coverage and final epidemic size, the degree-dependent subsidy scheme outperforms the flat discount scheme, but is dominated by the free ticket policy. (C) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.