The Efficiency of Paternalism
The Efficiency of Paternalism
复制标题
家长作风的效率
DOI：
10.2307/1073801
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Zamir
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Zamir
经济分析，特别是法律的经济分析，通常假定家长制和效率是分析和评价规则和行动的不相容的基础。大多数经济学家认为家长式作风效率低下。然而，本文通过诉诸规范经济学的理论基础，证明效率和家长主义是完全兼容的，并且效率分析实际上可能证明家长主义是合理的。文章然后提出了一个简单的模型来解释和评估现有的或建议的家长式法律的规则的效率。借鉴有限理性的心理学研究，本文说明了家长式的规则如何提高效率。
Economic analysis, and economic analysis of law in particular, ordinarily assumes that paternalism and efficiency are incompatible bases for analyzing and evaluating rules and actions. Most economists reject paternalism as inefficient. By appealing to the theoretical foundations of normative economics, this article demonstrates, however, that efficiency and paternalism are perfectly compatible, and that efficiency analysis may in fact justify paternalism. The article then proposes a simple model to explain and evaluate the efficiency of existing or suggested paternalistic legal rules. Drawing on psychological studies of bounded rationality, the article illustrates how paternalistic rules enhance efficiency.