EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
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DOI：
10.1016/0304-405x(94)00809-f
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发表时间：
1995-06-01
影响因子：
8.9
通讯作者：
MEHRAN, H
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
MEHRAN, H
1979 - 1980年，对153家随机选择的制造业公司的高管薪酬结构进行了研究，为激励性薪酬的倡导者提供了证据，并表明激励经理人增加公司价值的是薪酬的形式而不是水平，公司业绩与经理人持有的股权比例以及基于股权的薪酬比例呈正相关。此外，基于股权的薪酬在拥有更多外部董事的公司中使用得更广泛。最后，内部人或外部大股东持股比例较高的公司使用的股权薪酬较少。
An examination of the executive compensation structure of 153 randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 1979-1980 provides evidence supporting advocates of incentive compensation, and also suggests that the form rather than the level of compensation is what motivates managers to increase firm value, Firm performance is positively related to the percentage of equity held by managers and to the percentage of their compensation that is equity-based. Moreover, equity-based compensation is used more extensively in firms with more outside directors. Finally, firms in which a higher percentage of the shares are held by insiders or outside blockholders use less equity-based compensation.