Illusions in quantified reasoning: How to make the impossible seem possible, and vice versa
Illusions in quantified reasoning: How to make the impossible seem possible, and vice versa
复制标题
量化推理中的错觉：如何让不可能看起来可能，反之亦然
作者：
Yingrui Yang;P. Johnson
心理模型理论假定推理者为前提中描述的情况建立模型，而这些模型通常只代表真实的情况。这个理论产生了一个意想不到的结果。它预测了推论中幻觉的存在。某些推论应该有令人信服但错误的结论。两个实验证实了这种错觉的发生，即从量化断言的分离中推断出什么是可能的，例如，“至少有一些塑料珠子不是红色的。”实验1表明，参与者错误地推断不可能的情况是可能的，可能的情况是不可能的，但他们在基于相同前提的控制问题上表现良好。实验2在基于二元关系的推论中证实了这些发现，例如，“所有的男孩都和女孩一起玩”。
The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of the situations described in premises, and that these models normally represent only what is true. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence ofillusions in inferences. Certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Two experiments corroborated the occurrence of such illusions in inferences about what is possible from disjunctions of quantified assertions, such as, “at least some of the plastic beads are not red.” Experiment 1 showed that participants erroneously inferred that impossible situations were possible, and that possible situations were impossible, but that they performed well with control problems based on the same premises. Experiment 2 corroborated these findings in inferences from assertions based on dyadic relations, such as, “all the boys played with the girls.”