Trade Policy in Multilevel Government
Trade Policy in Multilevel Government
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多级政府的贸易政策
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发表时间：
2020
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Freudlsperger
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作者：
C. Freudlsperger
多级政府的贸易政策研究多级政府如何在全球化的政治和经济环境中组织开放。近年来，多层次的贸易政治吸引了更广泛公众的关注，尤其是由于瓦隆地区议会在 2016 年最初拒绝了欧盟-加拿大贸易协定。在所有多层次政治中，国家和地区所拥有的权力日益成为国际规则制定的主题。在贸易领域尤其如此，贸易领域已逐步针对所谓的“境内”监管壁垒。在对这一“深度贸易”议程的反应中，不同多层次政体的组成单位对市场自由化表现出截然不同的开放程度。这是为什么？多级政府的贸易政策认为，国内制度和政府间关系程序是决定性因素。贸易政策从业者和分析人士普遍认为，涉及地方行为体会使贸易谈判变得复杂化，这表明多层次政体在贸易政策制定中为其组成单位提供的发言权越大，后者最终退出新兴贸易协定的动力就越小。在共享规则体系中，组成单位政府在整个政策周期中都有直接代表权，而在自治体系中，领土代表权只是间接实现的。因此，在组织贸易开放方面，共享规则体系比自治体系更有效。本书通过对加拿大、欧盟和美国这三个多级政府体系的广泛研究，检验了这一理论对国际采购自由化案例的解释力。
Trade Policy in Multilevel Government investigates how multilevel polities organize openness in a globalizing political and economic environment. In recent years, the multilevel politics of trade caught the broader public’s attention, not least due to the Wallonian regional parliament’s initial rejection of the EU-Canada trade deal in 2016. In all multilevel polities, competencies held by states and regions have increasingly become the subject of international rule-setting. This is particularly so in the field of trade, which has progressively targeted so-called “behind the border” regulatory barriers. In their reaction to this “deep trade” agenda, constituent units in different multilevel polities have shown widely varying degrees of openness to liberalizing their markets. Why is that? Trade Policy in Multilevel Government argues that domestic institutions and procedures of intergovernmental relations are the decisive factor. Countering a widely held belief among practitioners and analysts of trade policy that involving subcentral actors complicates trade negotiations, it demonstrates that the more voice a multilevel polity affords its constituent units in trade policy-making, the less the latter have an incentive eventually to exit from emerging trade deals. While in shared rule systems constituent unit governments are directly represented along the entirety of the policy cycle, in self-rule systems territorial representation is achieved merely indirectly. Shared rule systems are hence more effective than self-rule systems in organizing openness to trade. The book tests the explanatory power of this theory on the understudied case of international procurement liberalization in extensive studies of three systems of multilevel government: Canada, the European Union, and the United States.