Online Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing Based on Two-Tiered Social Crowdsourcing Architecture
Online Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing Based on Two-Tiered Social Crowdsourcing Architecture
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DOI：
10.1109/sahcn.2018.8397102
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发表时间：
2018-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jia Xu;Chengcheng Guan;Haobo Wu;Dejun Yang;Lijie Xu;Tao Li
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jia Xu;Chengcheng Guan;Haobo Wu;Dejun Yang;Lijie Xu;Tao Li
移动众包已经成为执行大规模任务的有效范例。激励机制是移动众包系统激励参与者，实现良好服务质量的重要途径。本文主要研究预算约束下在线众包系统的参与率不足问题。我们提出了一个两层的社交众包架构，通过将任务分散到自己的社交圈，可以让被选中的注册用户招募到自己的社会邻居。在两层社交众包系统中，任务有不同的结束时间，注册用户和他们的社交邻居都有不同的到达/离开时间。针对这种新型的移动众包系统，提出了一种在线激励机制MTSC，该机制包括代理选择和在线逆向拍卖两个步骤。通过严谨的理论分析和广泛的仿真，我们证明了所提出的激励机制达到了计算效率、个体合理性、预算可行性、成本真实性和时间真实性。
Mobile crowdsourcing has become an efficient paradigm for performing large scale tasks. The incentive mechanism is important for the mobile crowdsourcing system to stimulate participants, and to achieve good service quality. In this paper, we focus on solving the insufficient participation problem in the budget constrained online crowdsourcing system. We present a two-tiered social crowdsourcing architecture, which can enable the selected registered users to recruit their social neighbors by diffusing the tasks to their social circles. In the two-tiered social crowdsourcing system, the tasks are associated with different end times, and both the registered users and their social neighbors have different arrival/departure times. An online incentive mechanism, MTSC, which consists of two steps: Agent Selection and Online Reverse Auction, is proposed for this novel mobile crowdsourcing system. Through both rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed incentive mechanism achieves computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget feasibility, cost truthfulness, and time truthfulness.