Contracting in ocean transportation with empty container repositioning under asymmetric information
Contracting in ocean transportation with empty container repositioning under asymmetric information
复制标题
信息不对称条件下集装箱空箱调运的海运合同
DOI：
10.1016/j.tre.2020.102173
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
10.6
通讯作者：
Ruina Yang;Mingzhu Yu;Chung-Yee Lee;Yuquan Du
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ruina Yang;Mingzhu Yu;Chung-Yee Lee;Yuquan Du
本文研究了一个信息不对称的两港系统中的合同签订问题，该系统涉及两个货运代理和一个承运人在两个港口之间提供远洋集装箱运输服务。我们建立了一个两阶段博弈模型，以捕捉具有空箱调仓的海运运输的独特特征。首先分析了承运人的最优策略，然后刻画了对称信息和非对称信息下承运人的最优合同。通过计算研究，考察了空箱调运成本和信息不对称对系统性能的影响。数值实验表明：(1)在市场需求可能较大的情况下，承运人更渴望获取私人信息，以避免信息不对称带来的利润损失；(2)信息不对称程度对不同运输方向的集装箱空箱调运成本的影响程度不同。
In the paper, we examine a contracting problem under asymmetric information in a two-port system involving two freight forwarders and one carrier providing ocean container transportation services between the two ports. We develop a two-stage game model to capture the unique characteristics of the ocean freight transportation with empty container repositioning. We first analyze the forwarders’ optimal strategies, and then characterize the optimal contract for the carrier under symmetric and asymmetric information. Through computational studies, we investigate the impacts of empty container repositioning cost and information asymmetry on the system performances. The numerical experiments reveal that (1) if the market demand is likely to be high, the ocean carrier is more eager to procure private information so as to prevent profit loss from information asymmetry; (2) the degree of information asymmetry has different impacts on the empty container repositioning cost in different transportation directions.