Stable Matchings and Rematching-Proof Equilibria in a Two-Sided Matching Market
Stable Matchings and Rematching-Proof Equilibria in a Two-Sided Matching Market
复制标题
双边匹配市场中的稳定匹配和防重匹配均衡
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1045
复制
发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Jinpeng Ma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jinpeng Ma
摘要本文引入了双边匹配市场的防再匹配均衡的概念，以解决Roth的公开问题：对于误报的配置文件，由任何稳定机制诱导的博弈均衡产生的匹配对于真实配置文件是稳定的。我们表明，一个rematching证明均衡的结果是稳定的，相对于真实的配置文件，即使均衡配置文件可能包含误报的偏好。我们还表明，存在一个rematching-proof均衡。此外，Roth（J.Econ.Theory34（1984），383-387）中的纳什均衡被证明是防再匹配均衡。经济文献分类号：C78，D 71。
Abstract In this paper we introduce the notion of a rematching-proof equilibrium for a two-sided matching market to resolve Roth′s open question: What kind of equilibria of the game induced by any stable mechanism with respect to misreported profiles produce matchings that are stable with respect to the true profile. We show that the outcome of a rematching-proof equilibrium is stable with respect to the true profile, even though the equilibrium profile may contain misreported preferences. We also show that a rematching-proof equilibrium exists. Moreover, the Nash equilibria in Roth (J. Econ. Theory34 (1984), 383-387) are shown to be rematching-proof equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D71.