The relationship between governance practices, audit quality and earnings management : UK evidence
The relationship between governance practices, audit quality and earnings management : UK evidence
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治理实践、审计质量和盈余管理之间的关系：英国证据
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发表时间：
2011
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通讯作者：
R. Basiruddin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Basiruddin
本论文检视两项实证研究。首先，它考察了公司治理特征（涉及规模、独立成员的组成、财务专长以及董事会和审计委员会的会议频率）与审计质量之间的关系。其次，本文考察了公司治理特征和高质量审计师对盈余管理的抑制效果。审计质量有三个代理：审计收费、非审计收费和行业专家审计师。根据2005年至2008年期间从富时350指数获得的数据，第一个实证研究结果表明，董事会的独立非执行董事要求审计师进行额外的和广泛的审计工作，以证明他们的监督职能，导致审计费用和审计质量的增加。研究结果还表明，独立董事会和非审计费用之间存在正相关关系，这表明独立董事会支持这样的观点，即审计和非审计服务的联合提供并不一定会损害审计师的独立性，而是它扩大了审计师的知识，提高了审计判断。第二项实证研究的结果表明，高质量的审计师（收取更高的审计费用或行业专家审计师）可能会减少盈余操纵。然而，没有证据表明，NAS费用影响盈余管理。此外，目前的研究发现，不一致的结果连接的公司治理特征和机会主义盈余。总的来说，这两个调查结果是一致的代理理论，其中指出，独立的董事会和更高质量的审计师与有效的监督，这反过来又有助于提高财务报告的质量。研究结果可能会引起决策者、专业人员和董事会的兴趣，特别是在有关审计质量和公司治理做法的授权问题上。
This thesis examines two empirical studies. Firstly, it examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics (relating to the size, composition of independent members, financial expertise and meeting frequency of boards of directors and audit committee) and audit quality. Secondly, the study investigates the effectiveness of corporate governance characteristics and higher quality auditors in constraining earnings management. There are three proxies of audit quality employed: audit fees, non-audit fees and industry specialist auditors. Based on data obtained from the FTSE 350 between 2005 and 2008, the first empirical findings suggest that independent non-executive directors on board demand an additional and extensive audit effort from the auditor in order to certify their monitoring function, resulting in an increase in the audit fees and the perceived audit quality. The results also indicate a positive relationship between independent board and non-audit fees, suggesting that independent board support the view that the joint provision of audit and non-audit services does not necessarily compromise auditor independence, but rather that it broadens the auditors’ knowledge and improves audit judgement. The findings from the second empirical study suggest that higher quality auditors (which either charge higher audit fees or are industry specialist auditors) are likely to reduce earnings manipulation. However, no evidence suggests that NAS fees affect earnings management. In addition, the current study finds inconsistent results linking the corporate governance characteristics and opportunistic earnings. Overall, both findings are consistent with agency theory, which states that independent board and higher quality auditors are associated with effective monitoring, which in turn helps to improve the quality of financial reporting. The findings are of potential interest to policy makers, professionals and boards of directors, especially on issues relating to audit quality and the mandating of corporate governance practices.