The Shapes of Scaled Earnings Histograms Are Not Due to Scaling and Sample Selection: Evidence from Distributions of Reported Earnings per Share
The Shapes of Scaled Earnings Histograms Are Not Due to Scaling and Sample Selection: Evidence from Distributions of Reported Earnings per Share
复制标题
缩放收益直方图的形状并非由缩放和样本选择决定：来自报告每股收益分布的证据
DOI：
10.1111/1911-3846.12020
复制
发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
S. Rock
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Jorgensen;Yong Gyu Lee;S. Rock
本文进行了一个自然的实验，在以前的研究中指出的三个违规行为有关的每股收益（EPS），可以说是最重要的业绩统计报告的经理人向市场和其他利益相关者。[1]首先，我们扩展了对托马斯（1989）所指出的报告每股收益最后一位数（美分）的不寻常模式的分析，即报告每股收益的最后一位数更可能是0或5，而盈利公司的最后一位数不太可能是9。其次，我们考虑了Degeorge、Patel和Zeckhauser（1999）以及Durstchi和伊斯顿（2005，DE05，以下简称）所指出的每股收益变化的阈值不规则性，即相对于预期，1美分的下降被低估了，这与公司避免报告每股收益下降是一致的。最后，我们重新审视了Das和Zhang（2003）指出的每股收益小数点后三位的舍入模式，即对于盈利公司，十分之一美分更有可能在5到9之间。虽然许多从业者和监管机构似乎相信盈余管理发生，但学术研究人员是否以及如何提供广泛的盈余管理横截面证据仍然存在重大分歧。例如，Graham、Harvey和Rajgopal（2005）采访了401名首席财务官（CFO），他们同意每股收益是一个重要的报告数字，但也承认每股收益受到相对容易受到操纵的可自由支配成分的影响。Dechow、Sloan和Sweeney（1996）分析了1978年至1990年期间证券交易委员会（SEC）发布的92份会计和审计执行公告（AAER），这些公告指控公司操纵收益。其中，39个AAER提供了至少一个解释盈余管理，其中11个报告上升趋势每股收益的动机。Schipper（1989）认为，盈余管理必须总是不透明的，难以发现，才能产生任何经济影响。松本（2002）认为，管理者除了管理报告的EPS外，还管理分析师的预期和预测。
This paper conducts a natural experiment of three irregularities noted in prior research related to reported earnings per share (EPS), arguably the most important performance statistic reported by managers to the market and other stakeholders. 1 First, we extend analysis of the unusual pattern in the last digit (cents) of reported EPS noted by Thomas (1989) that the last digit of reported EPS is more likely to be zero or five and less likely to be nine for profit firms. Second, we consider the threshold irregularity in EPS changes attributed to Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) and noted by Durstchi and Easton (2005, DE05, henceforth), that one-cent decreases are underrepresented, relative to expectations, consistent with firms avoiding reporting EPS decreases. Finally, we revisit the rounding pattern in third decimals of EPS noted by Das and Zhang (2003) that the one tenth of a cent is more likely between five and nine for profit firms. While many practitioners and regulators appear convinced that earnings management happens, substantial disagreement remains regarding whether and how academic researchers provide broad cross-sectional evidence of earnings management. For example, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) interviewed 401 chief financial officers (CFOs) who concur that EPS is an important reported number but also acknowledge that EPS is impacted by discretionary components that are relatively susceptible to manipulation. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) analyzed 92 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued between 1978 and 1990 that allege that companies manipulated earnings. Of these, 39 AAERs offered at least one explanation for earnings management, 11 of them report upward trending EPS as motivation. Schipper (1989) argues that earnings management must invariably be nontransparent and difficult to detect to have any economic effect. Matsumoto (2002) argues that managers—in addition to managing reported EPS—are also managing analysts’ expectations and their forecasts.