Preferential partner selection in an evolutionary study of Prisoner's Dilemma
Preferential partner selection in an evolutionary study of Prisoner's Dilemma
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DOI：
10.1016/0303-2647(95)01548-5
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发表时间：
1996-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Tesfatsion, L
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ashlock, D;Smucker, MD;Tesfatsion, L
伙伴选择是许多社会互动中的一个重要过程，允许个人降低与合作相关的风险。在大的群体中，叛逃者可能会通过在伴侣之间游荡来逃避惩罚，但在较小的群体中，叛逃者可能会面临社会孤立的风险。我们调查这些可能性的进化囚徒困境中，代理商使用预期的回报来选择和拒绝合作伙伴。在比较随机或循环合作伙伴匹配，我们发现，获得优先合作伙伴选择的平均收益往往是更狭窄的局限于几个孤立的收益区域。大多数生态进化到基本上完全合作的行为，但当代理人不能容忍背叛时，或者当拒绝和社会孤立的成本很小时，我们也会看到壁花生态的出现，其中所有代理人都是社会孤立的。在这两个极端之间，我们看到了生态的出现，其代理人倾向于参与少量的背叛，然后进行合作。后一种生态系统展现了大量有趣的社会互动模式。
Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but defectors in smaller populations risk social isolation. We investigate these possibilities for an evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma in which agents use expected payoffs to choose and refuse partners. In comparison to random or round-robin partner matching, we find that the average payoffs attained with preferential partner selection tend to be more narrowly confined to a few isolated payoff regions. Most ecologies evolve to essentially full cooperative behavior, but when agents are intolerant of defections, or when the costs of refusal and social isolation are small, we also see the emergence of wallflower ecologies in which all agents are socially isolated. Between these two extremes, we see the emergence of ecologies whose agents tend to engage in a small number of defections followed by cooperation thereafter. The latter ecologies exhibit a plethora of interesting social interaction patterns.