BIOSECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SYNTHESIS OF HORSEPOX, AN ORTHOPOXVIRUS
BIOSECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SYNTHESIS OF HORSEPOX, AN ORTHOPOXVIRUS
复制标题
DOI：
10.1089/hs.2017.0081
复制
发表时间：
2017-11-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Gronvall, Gigi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
DiEuliis, Diane;Berger, Kavita;Gronvall, Gigi
本文探讨了最近产生的马痘病毒（一种非循环（已灭绝）的正痘病毒）对生物安全和生物防御的影响。在这里，我们研究了马痘病毒合成的技术方面，并得出结论，正痘合成实验目前在技术上仍然具有挑战性，并且即使这项工作在科学文献中发表，也将继续如此。这限制了某些类型的恶意行为者的潜在滥用。我们还研究了马痘病毒再造的一个既定目的的影响：开发天花疫苗。如果开发成功，它可以利用美国政府的激励措施，对针对生物安全威胁的医疗对策（MCM）进行优先审查。然而，如果这种情况导致确定这种激励措施对安全产生反作用，则应根据需要对新创建的优先审查凭证计划进行更明确的定义或限制。然而，限制该计划可能会产生需要进一步考虑的成本，因为需要针对生物防御医疗对策开发的一般激励措施才能提供 MCM。最后，虽然马痘病毒的再造在技术上并不简单，也不是无细胞的，但这个实验事实上证明了已经假定的科学能力。无论采取何种政策控制，再现马痘或天花的能力都将保留。不可能堵住所有恶意滥用基因合成或更广泛地滥用生物材料的途径。因此，我们主张实施政策、法规和指导，使非法娱乐活动变得更加困难、繁重、更容易被发现，从而更容易预防，同时又不会给研究事业带来全面的负面影响。作为我们生物安全努力的一部分，我们还必须鼓励并使科学家积极参与，并尽其所能保护其技术领域免受不负责任或非法行为的影响。
This article examines the biosecurity and biodefense implications resulting from the recent creation of horsepox virus, a noncirculating (extinct) species of orthopoxvirus. Here we examine the technical aspects of the horsepox virus synthesis and conclude that orthopox synthesis experiments currently remain technically challengingand will continue to be so, even once this work is published in the scientific literature. This limits potential misuse by some types of nefarious actors. We also examine the implications of one stated purpose for the recreation of horsepox virus: the development of a smallpox vaccine. If the development is successful, it could take advantage of US government incentives for the priority FDA review of medical countermeasures (MCMs) against biosecurity threats. However, if this case leads to the determination that this incentive is counterproductive for security, the newly created priority review voucher program should be more clearly defined or limited based on need. Limiting the program could have costs that require further consideration, however, as general incentives for biodefense medical countermeasure development are required for MCMs to be available. Finally, while the recreation of horsepox virus was not technically trivial, nor was it cell-free, this experiment was a de facto demonstration of already-assumed scientific capabilities. The ability to recreate horsepox, or smallpox, will remain no matter what policy controls are put into place. It will be impossible to close off all avenues for nefarious misuse of gene synthesis, or misuse of biological materials more broadly. As a result, we advocate for the implementation of policy, regulations, and guidance that will make illicit recreation harder, more burdensome, more detectable, and, thus, more preventable without having sweeping negative consequences for the research enterprise. As part of our biosecurity efforts, we must also encourage and enable scientists to participate actively and to do all they can to safeguard their technical fields from irresponsible or illicit actions.