Voice matters in a dictator game

Voice matters in a dictator game
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DOI:
10.1007/s10683-007-9168-y
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发表时间:
2008-12
影响因子:
2.3
通讯作者:
Tetsuo Yamamori;Kazuhiko Kato;Toshiji Kawagoe;A. Matsui
Tetsuo Yamamori;Kazuhiko Kato;Toshiji Kawagoe;A. Matsui
中科院分区:
经济学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Tetsuo Yamamori;Kazuhiko Kato;Toshiji Kawagoe;A. Matsui

文献摘要

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我们进行了一项实验室实验,研究在独裁者游戏中沟通的效果,同时保持受试者的匿名性。在实验中,接受者有机会在独裁者说出他/她的报价之前,对他/她的份额提出一个与收益无关的请求。我们发现,独立性假设,声音并不重要被拒绝。特别是,如果请求少于蛋糕的一半,独裁者的出价会随着接收者请求的增加而增加。此外,没有一个独裁者是关心他人的,同时也不会对接受者的请求做出反应。
We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’ anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases. Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.