The Economics of Vertical Restraints in Distribution
The Economics of Vertical Restraints in Distribution
复制标题
分配纵向限制的经济学
DOI：
10.1007/978-1-349-18058-5_7
复制
发表时间：
1986
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ralph A. Winter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Mathewson;Ralph A. Winter
美国和其他国家针对分销纵向限制（制造商对零售商的价格和数量施加的限制）的反垄断政策一直支离破碎且不稳定。部分原因是对于这些限制所代表的含义缺乏共识。一方面，纵向限制被解释为卡特尔协调的垄断控制手段。另一方面，约束被视为可以用作纯粹垂直工具来实现“有效”分配形式的装置。
Anti-trust policy in the United States and other countries towards vertical restrictions on distribution (restrictions placed by manufacturers on retailers’ prices and quantities), has been fragmented and unsettled. This is, in part, because of a lack of consensus on what these restraints represent. On the one hand, vertical restraints have been explained as devices of monopolistic control of cartel coordination. On the other, restraints have been viewed as devices that can be used as purely vertical instruments to implement ‘efficient’ forms of distribution.