The Development of Concepts According to Vygotski.
The Development of Concepts According to Vygotski.
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维果茨基的概念发展。
DOI：
10.1007/978-1-4615-5893-4_7
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发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Sierpińska
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Sierpińska
1.在人的行为中，我们遇到了相当多的人为手段来控制自己的心理过程。通过与技术设备的类比，这些设备可以被简化和传统地称为心理工具或仪器（Claparede术语中的内部技术，根据Thurnwald的2种操作方式）。[1]第二章这个类比，就像任何类比一样，在两个概念的所有特征一致之前，不能进行到底。因此，我们不能预先期望在这些设备中找到劳动工具的每一个特征。如果类比在被比较的两个概念的主要的、中心的、最本质的特征上是正确的，那么它就可以被证明是合理的。这样一个决定性的特征是这些设备在行为中所起的作用，这类似于工具在劳动中的作用。3.心理学工具是人工形成的。就其性质而言，它们是社会性的，而不是有机的或个人的装置。它们的目的在于掌握自己的或别人的心理过程，就像技术设备的目的在于掌握自然过程一样。4.以下可以作为心理工具及其复杂系统的例子：语言，不同形式的计数和计数，记忆技术，代数符号，艺术作品，写作，计划，图表，地图，蓝图，各种传统符号，等等。心理工具被包含在行为过程中，通过决定新的工具性行为的结构来改变心理功能的整个过程和结构，正如技术工具通过决定劳动操作的形式来改变自然适应的过程一样。6.除了自然行为和行为过程之外，我们还必须区分人为的或工具性的行为功能和形式。前者是在进化发展过程中产生和发展的特殊机制，为人类和高等动物所共有。后者代表了人类后来的获得。它们是历史发展的产物，形成了人类特有的行为形式。在这个意义上，Ribot [1888]称非自愿注意为自然的，而自愿注意为人工的。他把自觉的注意力看作是历史发展的产物（参见《自然》）。Blonsky的观点）。7.我们不应该把人为的（工具性的）行为想象成超自然的或超自然的行为，这些行为是根据某些新的、特殊的法则而构建的。人工行为也是自然的。他们可以，没有剩余，到最后，被decom-
1. In the behavior of man we encounter quite a number of artificial devices for mastering his own mental processes. By analogy with technical devices these devices can justifiably and conventionally be called psychological tools or instruments (internal technique in Claparede's terminology, 2 modus operandi according to Thurnwald).[1]2. This analogy, like any analogy, cannot be carried through to the very end until all features of both concepts coincide. Therefore, we cannot expect beforehand that we will find each and every feature of a labor tool in these devices. The analogy may be justified if it is correct in the main, central, most essential feature of the two concepts that are being compared. Such a decisive feature is the role these devices play in behavior, which is analogous to the role of a tool in labor. 3. Psychological tools are artificial formations. By their nature they are social and not organic or individual devices. They are directed toward the mastery of [mental] processes-one's own or someone else's-just as technical devices are directed toward the mastery of processes of nature. 4. The following may serve as examples of psychological tools and their complex systems: language, different forms of numeration and counting, mnemotechnic techniques, algebraic symbolism, works of art, writing, schemes, diagrams, maps, blueprints, all sorts of conventional signs, etc. 5. By being included in the process of behavior, the psychological tool modifies the entire course and structure of mental functions by determining the structure of the new instrumental act, just as the technical tool modifies the process of natural adaptation by determining the form of labor operations. 6. In addition to natural acts and processes of behavior we must distinguish artificial, or instrumental, functions and forms of behavior. The former emerged and developed into special mechanisms in the process of evolutionary development and are shared by man and higher animals. The latter represent later acquisitions of mankind. They are the product of historical development and form a specifically human form of behavior. In this sense, Ribot [1888] called involuntary attention natural and voluntary attention artificial. He viewed voluntary attention as the product of historical development (cf. Blonsky's view). 7. We should not conceive of artificial (instrumental) acts as supernatural or meta-natural acts constructed in accordance with some new, special laws. Artificial acts are natural as well. They can, without remainder, to the very end, be dec om-