Information-theoretic security proof of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocol based on complementarity
Information-theoretic security proof of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocol based on complementarity
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DOI：
10.1088/2058-9565/aa8705
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发表时间：
2017-04
影响因子：
6.7
通讯作者：
Akihiro Mizutani;Toshihiko Sasaki;G. Kato;Yuki Takeuchi;K. Tamaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Akihiro Mizutani;Toshihiko Sasaki;G. Kato;Yuki Takeuchi;K. Tamaki
我们证明了差分相移（DPS）量子密钥分发（QKD）协议在基于互补方法的渐近体制下的信息论安全性（arXiv：0704.3661（2007））。我们的安全性证明提供了比在基于Shor-Preskill方法（Shor and Preskill 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 441）。这种改进是因为互补方法可以在估计泄露给窃听者的信息时采用关于Alice的发送状态的更详细信息。此外，我们消除了在先前的分析中估计泄漏信息所需的数值计算的必要性。这导致了一个优点，即我们的安全证明使我们能够评估任何块大小的DPS协议的安全性。本文强调了一个根本的区别之间的短Preskill和互补性的方法。
We prove the information-theoretic security of the differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol in the asymptotic regime based on the complementarity approach (arXiv:0704.3661 (2007)). Our security proof provides a slightly better key generation rate compared to the one derived in the previous security proof in (arXiv:1208.1995 (2012)) that is based on the Shor–Preskill approach (Shor and Preskill 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 441). This improvement is obtained because the complementarity approach can employ more detailed information on Alice’s sending state in estimating the leaked information to an eavesdropper. Moreover, we remove the necessity of the numerical calculation that was needed in the previous analysis to estimate the leaked information. This leads to an advantage that our security proof enables us to evaluate the security of the DPS protocol with any block size. This paper highlights one of the fundamental differences between the Shor–Preskill and the complementarity approaches.