Decision making in trade credit financing: impact of loss aversion and power imbalance
Decision making in trade credit financing: impact of loss aversion and power imbalance
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/itor.12912
复制
发表时间：
2020-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
W. Jin;Qinhong Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Jin;Qinhong Zhang
我们将损失厌恶和权力不平衡纳入贸易信贷合同中，在订购时设定批发价格和付款比例。我们的模型基于二元供应链，由不愿损失的供应商和资本有限的零售商组成，零售商可以通过银行信贷或贸易信贷获得融资。我们推导出零售商主导的非合作（RDN）和供应商主导的非合作（SDN）博弈下的最优贸易信用契约。我们的研究结果表明，供应商损失厌恶的影响取决于供应商是否在供应链中占据主导地位。具体来说，在RDN场景下，无论供应商的损失厌恶程度如何，零售商都应采用单一银行信贷。然而，在SDN场景下，当供应商的损失厌恶水平超过临界阈值时，应向零售商提供银行信贷和贸易信贷的混合信贷，否则应授予单一贸易信贷。此外，我们发现资金有限的零售商可能会从供应商的损失厌恶行为中受益。最后，我们进行了一系列数值示例，以得出更多管理见解。
We incorporate loss aversion and power imbalance into a trade credit contract that sets both wholesale price and payment ratio at ordering time. Our models are based on a dyadic supply chain consisting of a loss‐averse supplier and a capital‐constrained retailer who can get finance via bank credit or trade credit. We derive the optimal trade credit contract under the retailer‐dominant noncooperative (RDN) and the supplier‐dominant noncooperative (SDN) games. Our results show that the impact of the supplier's loss aversion depends on whether the supplier dominates the supply chain. Specifically, under RDN scenario, a single bank credit should be adopted by the retailer, irrespective of the supplier's loss aversion. Under SDN scenario, however, a hybrid of bank credit and trade credit should be provided to the retailer when the supplier's loss aversion level exceeds a critical threshold value, and a single trade credit should be granted otherwise. Moreover, we find that the capital‐constrained retailer may benefit from the supplier's loss aversion behavior. Finally, we conduct a serial of numerical examples to develop more managerial insights.