Equivalence theorem, consistency and axiomatizations of a multi-choice value
Equivalence theorem, consistency and axiomatizations of a multi-choice value
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DOI:
10.1007/s10898-008-9392-9
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发表时间:
2009-12
影响因子:
1.8
通讯作者:
Yan-An Hwang;Y. Liao
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Yan-An Hwang;Y. Liao
This paper is devoted to the study of solutions for multi-choice games which admit a potential, such as the potential associated with the extended Shapley value proposed by Hsiao and Raghavan (Int J Game Theory 21:301–302, 1992; Games Econ Behav 5:240–256, 1993). Several axiomatizations of the family of all solutions that admit a potential are offered and, as a main result, it is shown that each of these solutions can be obtained by applying the extended Shapley value to an appropriately modified game. In the framework of multi-choice games, we also provide an extension of the reduced game introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 57:589–614, 1989). Different from the works of Hsiao and Raghavan (1992, 1993), we provide two types of axiomatizations, one is the analogue of Myerson’s (Int J Game Theory 9:169–182, 1980) axiomatization of the Shapley value based on the property of balanced contributions. The other axiomatization is obtained by means of the property of consistency.