A construction of encryption protocols over some semidirect products
A construction of encryption protocols over some semidirect products
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DOI：
10.1515/jmc-2022-0018
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发表时间：
2023-01
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Shuji Isobe;E. Koizumi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shuji Isobe;E. Koizumi
在CANDARW '18中，Isobe等人基于Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld密钥交换协议提出了一个非阿贝尔群上的安全加密协议。该协议仍然存在两个弱点：一是在稍微受限的意义上，该协议无法区分自适应选择密文攻击（IND-CCA），他们称之为IND-rCCA安全，另一个是对组和散列方案施加的条件过于严格，使协议实用。在这篇文章中，我们提出了一个IND-CCA安全协议，解决了这些问题。其核心思想是使用特定的半直积作为平台群，从而可以从群和散列方案的简洁条件中得到精确的IND-CCA安全性。我们的协议是不依赖于任何阿贝尔子群的计算假设。
Abstract In CANDARW ’18, Isobe et al. proposed a secure encryption protocol on non-abelian groups based on the Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld key exchange protocol. There have remained two weak points on the protocol: one is that the protocol is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) in a slightly restricted sense, what they call IND-rCCA secure, and the other is that the conditions imposed on groups and hashing schemes are too strict to make the protocol practical. In this article, we propose an IND-CCA secure protocol that resolves those problems. The key idea is to employ some specific semidirect product as platform groups, so that we can achieve the exact IND-CCA security from concise conditions on groups and hashing schemes. Our protocol is not dependent on any computational assumptions on abelian subgroups.