Pricing of parking games with atomic players
Pricing of parking games with atomic players
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.trb.2014.12.003
复制
发表时间：
2015-03-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Zhou, Jing
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
He, Fang;Yin, Yafeng;Zhou, Jing
本文考虑了一个停车竞争博弈，来自不同来源的有限数量的车辆竞争相同数量的停车位，位于市中心的不同地方，以最小化自己的停车成本。如果一辆车在另一辆车之前到达所需的空闲停车位，则它将占用该空间，而另一辆车将不得不在其他地方寻找。我们首先提出了一个系统的非线性方程来描述停车位的车辆的均衡分配，然后讨论最优定价方案，引导这样的停车场竞争的系统最优分配的停车位。这些计划的特点是由一个联盟的多面体。考虑到停车竞争的均衡状态不是唯一的，我们进一步引入了一个有效的价格向量，以确保停车竞争的结果总是系统最优的。一个充分条件，提供了这样一个有效的价格向量的存在。最后，我们寻求一个强大的价格向量，产生最好的最坏情况下的停车场竞争的结果。(C)2014爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
This paper considers a parking competition game where a finite number of vehicles from different origins compete for the same number of parking spaces located at various places in a downtown area to minimize their own parking costs. If one vehicle reaches a desired vacant parking space before another vehicle, it will occupy the space and the other vehicle would have to search elsewhere. We first present a system of nonlinear equations to describe the equilibrium assignment of parking spaces to vehicles, and then discuss optimal pricing schemes that steer such parking competition to a system optimum assignment of parking spaces. These schemes are characterized by a union of polyhedrons. Given that the equilibrium state of parking competition is not unique, we further introduce a valid price vector to ensure that the parking competition outcome will always be system optimum. A sufficient condition is provided for the existence of such a valid price vector. Lastly, we seek for a robust price vector that yields the best worst-case outcome of the parking competition. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.