Do retirement savings increase in response to information about retirement and expected pensions?
Do retirement savings increase in response to information about retirement and expected pensions?
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.12.014
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发表时间：
2018-02-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Stichnoth, Holger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dolls, Mathias;Doerrenberg, Philipp;Stichnoth, Holger
如何增加退休储蓄？我们在德国养老金制度的背景下探索了一个独特的政策变化来研究这个问题。从2005年开始（2002年至2004年为逐步实施阶段），德国养老金管理部门开始每年发送信件，提供有关养老金制度和个人预期公共养老金支付的详细和可理解的信息。这项改革没有改变养老金的水平，只是向个人提供了有关其预期养老金支付的信息。使用德国纳税申报数据，我们利用年龄不连续性来确定这些字母对个人行为的影响。我们发现可免税的私人退休储蓄有所增加，并提供证据表明，这不是由于其他形式的储蓄被挤出市场。我们还表明，劳动收入，即增加公共养老金的最直接方式，在收到信件后增加。
How can retirement savings be increased? We explore a unique policy change in the context of the German pension system to study this question. As of 2005 (with a phase-in period between 2002 and 2004), the German pension administration started to send out annual letters providing detailed and comprehensible information about the pension system and individual expected public pension payments. This reform did not change the level of pensions, but only provided information to individuals about their expected pension payments. Using German tax return data, we exploit an age discontinuity to identify the effect of these letters on the behavior of individuals. We find an increase in tax-deductible private retirement savings and provide evidence that this is not due to a crowding-out of other forms of savings. We also show that labor earnings, i.e. the most direct way to increase public pensions, increase after receiving the letter.