Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections
Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections
复制标题
对称二元选举中的顺序投票程序
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Michele Piccione
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Eddie Dekel;Michele Piccione
我们探索对称双选项环境中的顺序投票。我们证明了同时投票博弈的（信息）对称均衡在任何顺序投票结构中也是均衡。在随机博弈中，（本质上）所有序列结构中的整组均衡都是相同的。我们还探讨了在其他情况下，同时和顺序投票之间的关系。我们举例说明了几个例子中，顺序投票没有更好地聚合信息比同时投票。序贯结构无法在投票模型中使用额外的信息，这与羊群级联文献中的情况不同。
We explore sequential voting in symmetric two‐option environments. We show that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultancous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting structure. In unanimity games, (essentially) the whole set of equilibria is the same in all sequential structures. We also explore the relationship between simultaneous and sequential voting in other contexts. We illustrate several instances in which sequential voting does no better at aggregating information than simultaneous voting. The inability of the sequential structure to use additional information in voting models is distinct from that in the herd‐cascade literature.