What Shareholers in Japan Say About Pay: Does Article 361 of Japan's Companies Act Matter?
What Shareholers in Japan Say About Pay: Does Article 361 of Japan's Companies Act Matter?
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日本股东如何评价薪酬：日本公司法第 361 条重要吗？
DOI：
10.1017/asjcl.2017.26
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
David Green
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sean McGinty;David Green
日本企业高管的薪酬水平较低且结构各异，最近引发了人们对日本高管薪酬决定因素的兴趣。一个尚未审查的因素是《公司法》第 361 条所扮演的角色，该条要求董事薪酬由股东大会确定。为了探讨这一规则是否通过赋予股东否决权来改变他们不同意的薪酬、在日本支付的事项，本文考察了2014年东京证券交易所第一部上市公司的股东大会对薪酬决议进行投票的结果。我们发现，虽然所有决议都获得通过，但董事要求的薪酬和股东的反应都存在显着差异，且与各自的差异相关。结果与规则的相关性根据公司环境而变化的观点是一致的。虽然在大多数公司中，股东对薪酬进行投票相对没有争议，但某些公司所有权和治理结构的变化提供了一条途径，通过该途径，该规则现在可能对薪酬产生影响。
The modest level and differing structure of compensation Japanese corporate executives receive has sparked recent interest in the determinants of executive pay in Japan. One factor that remains unexamined is the role played by Article 361 of the Companies Act which requires that director pay be set by the general shareholders’ meeting. To explore the question of whether this rule, by giving shareholders a veto over changes to compensation they disagree with, matters to pay in Japan, this article examines the results of the shareholders’ meetings of companies listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange that voted on compensation resolutions in 2014. We find that, while all resolutions were approved, there was significant variation in both what pay directors asked for and how shareholders responded that was correlated with differences in each. The results are consistent with the view that the relevance of the rule varies depending on the context of the company. While at most companies, shareholder voting on pay is relatively uncontroversial, the changing structure of ownership and governance at some provides an avenue through which the rule may now matter to pay.