Environmental Certification of Forests in Mexico: The Political Ecology of a Nongovernmental Market Intervention
Environmental Certification of Forests in Mexico: The Political Ecology of a Nongovernmental Market Intervention
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墨西哥森林环境认证：非政府市场干预的政治生态
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8306.2006.00705.x
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Klooster
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Klooster
产品生产过程的环境和社会特征认证正在成为一种重要的跨国、非政府、以市场为基础的环境监管和发展方法。本文运用惯例分析和商品网络分析，考察了这种市场干预的政治生态。在仅仅十年之后，森林环境认证已经扩展到世界上相当大一部分被砍伐的森林，主要的木材零售商越来越多地要求认证，国际环境组织也大力支持。在墨西哥，12%的木材收获都得到了认证，认证要求森林管理者在森林管理的社会和环境方面做出实质性的改进。墨西哥木材商品网络的参与者包括森林村民、森林管理者、木材加工者、政府监管者和跨国木材零售商。这些行为者表达了一系列的环境关切、社会价值观以及对价格和市场份额的兴趣。然而，大型零售商是商品网络中最强大的参与者，它们对高产量和低价格的需求占主导地位。因此，森林认证迄今未能产生使森林管理者能够支付认证费用及其所需的森林管理改进的价格;该文书对南方生产者提出要求，但没有对他们的努力给予奖励。除了公平问题，商品网络的这些特点限制了森林认证的采用，以及它产生的森林管理改进，只有墨西哥最大的森林管理业务。墨西哥的情况表明，非政府的、基于市场的环境治理和发展办法受到更广泛的限制。对于产品认证能够在零售商等强大行为者所控制的市场中注入价值，这些国家需要少一些天真。纳入以公平贸易为模式的规则将扩大其范围、公平性和有效性;然而，自愿的市场工具不能取代政府在环境监管和发展项目中更直接的作用。
Abstract The certification of the environmental and social characteristics of a product's production process is emerging as a significant transnational, nongovernmental, market-based approach to environmental regulation and development. Using conventions analysis and commodity network analysis, this article examines the political ecology of one such market intervention. After only a decade, environmental certification of forests has spread to cover a significant portion of the world's logged forests, major wood retailers increasingly require it, and international environmental organizations strongly support it. In Mexico, where 12 percent of the wood harvest is certified, certification requires forest managers to make substantial improvements to the social and environmental aspects of forest management. Actors in the Mexican wood commodity network include forest villagers, forest managers, wood processors, government regulators, and transnational wood retailers. These actors express an array of environmental concerns, social values, and interests in price and market share. The big retailers, however, are the most powerful actors in the commodity network, and their demands for high volumes and low prices dominate. As a result, forest certification has so far failed to generate prices that permit forest managers to cover the costs of certification and its required forest management improvements; the instrument imposes requirements on southern producers without rewarding them for their increased efforts. In addition to the equity issues, these features of the commodity network limit the adoption of forest certification—and the forest management improvements it generates—to only the largest forest management operations in Mexico. The case of Mexico suggests broader limitations to nongovernmental, market-based approaches to environmental governance and development. These need to be less naïve about the ability of product certification to insert values in markets governed by powerful actors like retailers. Including rules modeled on Fair Trade will extend their reach, equity, and efficacy; nevertheless, voluntary market-based instruments cannot replace a more direct government role in environmental regulation and development projects.