Size, Sunk Costs, and Judge Bowker's Objection to Free Trade
Size, Sunk Costs, and Judge Bowker's Objection to Free Trade
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规模、沉没成本以及鲍克法官对自由贸易的反对
DOI：
10.7916/d8m90h55
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. McLaren
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. McLaren
在大国和小国之间的贸易自由化中，如果生产需要不可逆转的投资，那么预期的谈判可能会使小国的处境比完全预期的贸易战更糟，甚至比独裁更糟。其原因是，投资者期待自由贸易，将投资于出口部门，使小国依赖于与大国的贸易，从而破坏了其讨价还价的能力。这种影响主要是由传统的影响，因此，预期的讨价还价有利于小国的平衡，如果有足够的：经济之间和货物之间的差异。版权所有1997年美国经济协会。
In trade liberalization between a large country and a small one, if production requires irreversible investments, anticipated negotiations may make the small country strictly worse off than a fully anticipated trade war, and indeed worse off than autarchy. The reason is that investors, anticipating liberal trade, will invest in the export sector, making the small country dependent on trade with the large one and thus ruining its bargaining power. This effect is dominated by conventional effects, so that anticipated bargaining benefits the small country on balance, if there is sufficient: dissimilarity between the economies and between goods. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.